---
title: What Kind of Knowledge is Best Shared Through Collaboration in the Army?
canonical: https://corporate-knowhow.com/what-kind-of-knowledge-is-best-shared-through-collaboration-in-the-army/
author: Corporate Know-How Editorial Staff
published: 2026-09-26
updated: 2026-09-08
language: en
category: Knowledge Sharing and Collaboration
description: Shared operational knowledge combines observations, interpretations, confidence levels, uncertainties, and reassessment triggers to support coordinated action. Clear command intent adds purpose, priorities, constraints, and decision logic for decentralized decisions.
source: Provimedia GmbH
---

# What Kind of Knowledge is Best Shared Through Collaboration in the Army?

> **Autor:** Corporate Know-How Editorial Staff | **Veröffentlicht:** 2026-09-26 | **Aktualisiert:** 2026-09-08

**Zusammenfassung:** Shared operational knowledge combines observations, interpretations, confidence levels, uncertainties, and reassessment triggers to support coordinated action. Clear command intent adds purpose, priorities, constraints, and decision logic for decentralized decisions.

---

## Shared Operational Knowledge for a Common Understanding
**Shared operational knowledge should help different units build the same working picture of a changing situation.** It is not a complete data dump, but a tested, time-stamped understanding of what is happening, what remains uncertain, and why the information matters for the mission.

The most useful shared knowledge connects four elements:

- **What was observed:** the source, time, location, and conditions of an observation.

- **What it may mean:** the current interpretation, including alternative explanations.

- **How reliable it is:** the confidence level, gaps, and possible sources of error.

- **What may change next:** indicators that would confirm, weaken, or overturn the assessment.

This structure prevents a common failure: treating an unverified report as an established fact. A unit may know that a report came from a sensor, a patrol, or a partner force. It must also know whether the report is new, repeated, indirect, or contradicted by another source. Such context turns raw information into usable operational knowledge.

Collaboration is especially valuable when knowledge is distributed across functions. Intelligence staff may understand patterns. Logistics teams may know which routes, supplies, or recovery options are realistic. Medical personnel may identify risks that are invisible in a tactical picture. Engineers may explain terrain, infrastructure, or mobility limits. Each contribution changes the meaning of the whole picture.

A strong shared picture therefore includes disagreement, not just consensus. Competing assessments should remain visible when the evidence is incomplete. This makes uncertainty easier to manage and reduces the risk that a confident but weak interpretation will dominate the group.

Useful entries are concise but rich in context. A practical format can include:

- observation and source;

- time and place;

- confidence and known gaps;

- impact on current tasks;

- alternative explanations;

- conditions that require a reassessment.

Shared operational knowledge should also preserve its history. When an assessment changes, the record should show what new evidence caused the change. This creates traceability, supports learning after an operation, and helps other units avoid repeating old errors without confusing later conclusions with what was known at the time.

The best standard is simple: Can another unit understand the situation, judge the uncertainty, and act without waiting for a long explanation? If not, more data may not solve the problem. Better context will.

*Source:* The knowledge-management analysis in *Thoughts about C4I Systems*, published on 20 October 2014 under CC BY 3.0, links shared understanding with collaborative sense-making and decentralized military decision-making.

## Collaborative Sense-Making from Incomplete and Conflicting Information
**Collaborative sense-making is most valuable when reports are incomplete, delayed, or in conflict.** The aim is not to force quick agreement. It is to compare observations, test assumptions, and identify which parts of an assessment are solid enough to guide action.

Each contributor should separate three things: what was directly observed, what was inferred, and what remains unknown. This simple distinction limits the spread of rumours and gives specialists room to challenge an attractive but weak explanation.

- **Observation:** a recorded event, signal, image, statement, or physical sign.

- **Inference:** a conclusion drawn from one or more observations.

- **Uncertainty:** missing evidence, doubtful timing, unclear intent, or competing explanations.

- **Disconfirmation:** evidence that would show the current assessment is wrong.

Conflicting reports should be compared by origin, timing, access, and possible bias. Two reports may appear to disagree while describing different moments. A third report may resolve the issue, or it may expose a deeper gap. The point is not to count reports like votes; it is to judge their quality and relevance.

Teams can improve this work by asking focused questions:

- Which facts are independently supported?

- Which assumptions entered the assessment?

- What alternative explanation fits the same evidence?

- What information would change the current view?

- Which unknown creates the greatest risk to the mission?

A useful collaborative record should preserve minority views when the evidence is weak. Dissent acts as a brake against groupthink and can reveal a blind spot before it becomes an operational error. Each alternative should state its evidence, confidence, and practical consequence.

Different staff functions can test the same assessment from different angles. Intelligence may examine intent and patterns. Operations may ask whether the assessment fits observed activity. Logistics may identify constraints that make a proposed explanation unlikely. Civil affairs or liaison personnel may add local context. This cross-checking creates knowledge that no single branch can produce alone.

The result should be a set of working hypotheses, not false certainty. Marking an assessment as provisional does not weaken it. It tells others how firmly they may rely on it and what signals deserve renewed attention.

This approach supports the sense-making phase of the OODA cycle: observation becomes interpretation through disciplined exchange. The value of collaboration lies less in producing one confident story than in producing a clearer map of facts, possibilities, risks, and unknowns.

*Source:* [Thoughts about C4I Systems](https://c4isr.blogspot.com/), “Evolution of Military Decision-Making from a Knowledge Management Perspective,” 20 October 2014, CC BY 3.0.

## Knowledge Types That Strengthen Collaborative Army Decision-Making

  
    | 
      Knowledge type | 
      What it includes | 
      Why collaboration matters | 
      Practical benefit | 
    

  
  
    | 
      Shared operational knowledge | 
      Observed facts, sources, timing, location, confidence, and possible changes | 
      Different units can build the same working picture while keeping uncertainty visible | 
      More reliable decisions and fewer misunderstandings | 
    

    | 
      Local situation knowledge | 
      Terrain, mobility limits, local customs, infrastructure, weather, and population patterns | 
      Personnel at the point of action can correct assumptions made by distant staffs | 
      More realistic and adaptable plans | 
    

    | 
      Intelligence and assessments | 
      Patterns, interpretations, alternative explanations, confidence levels, and indicators | 
      Cross-functional review helps distinguish evidence from inference | 
      Better anticipation and reduced groupthink | 
    

    | 
      Commander's intent | 
      Mission purpose, desired end state, priorities, authority, risks, and constraints | 
      Shared understanding enables subordinate leaders to act independently within clear limits | 
      Faster decentralized decisions | 
    

    | 
      Logistics and sustainment knowledge | 
      Supply status, transport capacity, maintenance needs, recovery options, and route limitations | 
      Operational plans must reflect what support units can actually provide | 
      Feasible operations and fewer avoidable delays | 
    

    | 
      Medical and protection knowledge | 
      Casualty risks, medical capacity, evacuation routes, safety concerns, and civilian effects | 
      Medical and protection perspectives reveal risks that may be overlooked in a tactical picture | 
      Improved force protection and responsible action | 
    

    | 
      Cross-unit dependencies | 
      Timing conflicts, handoffs, capability limits, coordination needs, and effects on neighbouring units | 
      Units can understand how their actions influence other functions and formations | 
      Greater synchronization and fewer coordination failures | 
    

    | 
      Lessons learned | 
      What happened, what was expected, why a gap occurred, and what should change | 
      Experience becomes reusable knowledge instead of remaining with one team | 
      Continuous improvement and fewer repeated mistakes | 
    

    | 
      Uncertainty and dissent | 
      Knowledge gaps, competing assessments, assumptions, and conditions for reassessment | 
      Visible disagreement challenges weak interpretations and reduces overconfidence | 
      More resilient judgment under changing conditions | 
    

  

## Commander's Intent and Knowledge for Decentralized Decisions
**Commander's intent is the decision frame that allows subordinate leaders to act without waiting for detailed instructions.** It must explain the purpose of the mission, the desired end state, the main effort, and the limits that protect higher priorities. A vague slogan is not enough. People need to understand what success looks like and which trade-offs are acceptable.

The most useful intent answers five practical questions:

- **Why does the mission matter?** This links local action to the wider purpose.

- **What result is required?** The end state should be observable, not abstract.

- **What must receive priority?** This identifies the main effort when resources are scarce.

- **What constraints apply?** Legal, political, operational, and safety limits must be clear.

- **What risks may be accepted?** Leaders need to know where initiative is expected and where caution is essential.

Intent becomes stronger when it includes decision logic, not only direction. A subordinate commander should understand which condition would justify continuing the current approach, changing it, or stopping it. This does not replace judgment; it gives judgment a useful boundary.

Knowledge shared with the intent should therefore include priorities, dependencies, and known tensions. For example, speed may matter more than perfect information, while protection of civilians or preservation of a critical capability may set a firm limit. Such choices help units resolve conflicts without sending every question back up the chain.

The wording should be short enough to remember under pressure. A practical intent can use this sequence:

- purpose;

- desired effect;

- priority;

- freedom of action;

- non-negotiable limits.

Leaders should then check whether the intent has been understood, not merely transmitted. Ask a subordinate leader to explain the mission in their own words, including the reason for the priority and the conditions for changing course. This reveals ambiguity early and can prevent a large mismatch between headquarters and the point of action.

Shared intent also needs revision when the mission changes. A new task, lost capability, or altered political constraint may make the earlier decision frame unsafe. Updating intent is not micromanagement. It is the responsible way to preserve freedom of action while keeping separate units aligned.

In knowledge-management terms, commander's intent converts purpose into reusable decision knowledge. It lets teams make sound choices in situations that the original order did not describe. That is the heart of decentralized command: central leaders define meaning and boundaries, while local leaders apply judgment to the facts in front of them.

*Source:* [Thoughts about C4I Systems](https://c4isr.blogspot.com/), “Evolution of Military Decision-Making from a Knowledge Management Perspective,” 20 October 2014, CC BY 3.0.

## Local Situation Knowledge at the Point of Action
**Local situation knowledge is the practical knowledge held by people closest to the event, terrain, population, and immediate constraints.** It often includes details that do not appear in formal reports: a route that becomes unusable after rain, a bridge that cannot carry heavy vehicles, a local custom that affects access, or a small change in civilian behaviour.

This knowledge should be shared because it can alter the feasibility of a plan. A map may show a road, but a patrol may know that construction, flooding, debris, or checkpoints make it unsuitable. A standard route may look efficient, yet a local liaison officer may understand why its use would damage trust. These are not minor details. They shape what can actually be done.

Useful local knowledge usually falls into five groups:

- **Terrain and mobility:** surfaces, obstacles, visibility, access points, and seasonal changes.

- **Human patterns:** daily movement, community ties, language, customs, and trusted intermediaries.

- **Infrastructure:** power, water, communications, transport, medical access, and repair capacity.

- **Local warnings:** unusual activity, emerging tension, rumours, or changes in routine.

- **Practical constraints:** weather, fatigue, equipment limits, time windows, and support availability.

Local knowledge is not automatically accurate. Familiarity can produce insight, but it can also create habits and blind spots. The strongest approach gives local contributors a clear way to state what they know, how they know it, and where their view may be limited. Their input should inform professional judgment, not replace it.

Sharing should work in both directions. Higher headquarters can provide context, priorities, and resources. Local teams can then explain how those decisions interact with real conditions. If their feedback disappears into a reporting system, collaboration becomes cosmetic and people will stop contributing the details that matter most.

Good local knowledge also needs protection from distortion. Names, locations, and sensitive community information should be handled according to classification rules and operational need. At the same time, excessive restriction can hide vital context from the people who must act. The right question is not simply who created the information, but who needs the knowledge to perform a legitimate duty.

A useful local update can be brief:

- what has changed;

- where and when the change was seen;

- who is affected;

- what action may be harder or easier;

- which specialist or local source can clarify the point.

When this knowledge reaches planners and neighbouring units, plans become more realistic and less brittle. The people at the point of action do not just receive knowledge. They create it through direct contact with conditions that distant staffs can only model.

## Cross-Level and Cross-Unit Knowledge Sharing
**Cross-level and cross-unit knowledge sharing connects different responsibilities into one usable command picture.** Its value lies in linking knowledge that is separated by rank, function, location, or mission. A brigade may understand the wider purpose, while a company knows its immediate limits and a support unit sees a supply problem developing. Each view becomes more useful when the right parts are connected.

Sharing across levels should not mean sending every detail upward. Higher headquarters need patterns, consequences, decision points, and resource implications. Subordinate units need the context that explains priorities and dependencies. The exchange should therefore be adapted to the receiver’s role.

- **Upward:** report changes, constraints, risks, and effects on assigned tasks.

- **Downward:** share priorities, dependencies, assumptions, and relevant changes in direction.

- **Across units:** exchange coordination needs, capability limits, timing conflicts, and support requirements.

- **Across functions:** connect operational, intelligence, logistics, medical, engineering, and liaison knowledge.

A key requirement is a shared vocabulary. Terms such as “ready,” “delayed,” “secure,” or “mission capable” can mean different things to different units. Common definitions reduce friction and make reports easier to compare. Where a formal definition does not exist, the sender should state what the term means in that specific context.

Cross-unit exchange also helps reveal dependencies. One unit’s movement may affect another unit’s access, communications, medical support, or resupply. These links are often invisible inside separate reporting chains. Mapping them turns isolated updates into a view of how actions interact.

Effective collaboration needs clear ownership. Every shared item should have a responsible person or staff function that can update it, correct it, or explain its limits. Without ownership, old information remains in circulation and users cannot tell whether it is still valid.

Practical exchange rules can include:

- share information with the units whose work may be affected;

- mark changes rather than reposting unchanged material;

- identify the action, decision, or coordination need linked to the update;

- record unresolved handoffs between units;

- close the loop by confirming receipt and result.

This approach supports self-synchronization. Units can coordinate routine interactions without asking headquarters to manage every connection. That freedom is safe only when teams understand how their tasks affect others and when important changes move across boundaries quickly.

The central test is whether knowledge can travel with its meaning intact. If a detail reaches another unit but loses its purpose, timing, or consequence, the transfer is technically complete yet operationally weak.

*Source:* [Thoughts about C4I Systems](https://c4isr.blogspot.com/), “Evolution of Military Decision-Making from a Knowledge Management Perspective,” 20 October 2014, CC BY 3.0.

## Mission Command Knowledge: Goals, Limits, and Freedom of Action
**Mission command knowledge defines where initiative is expected, where it is limited, and how local decisions support the assigned purpose.** Its value lies in making freedom of action deliberate rather than accidental. A subordinate leader should know which outcomes matter most, which choices remain open, and which actions require renewed authorization.

Mission command works best when knowledge is organized around decision boundaries:

- **Goal:** the concrete effect or condition the unit must achieve.

- **Authority:** the decisions the subordinate leader may make independently.

- **Constraints:** legal, political, safety, resource, and coordination limits.

- **Triggers:** changes that require adaptation, escalation, or a pause.

- **Accountability:** the record of decisions, reasons, and results.

Freedom of action is not unlimited discretion. It is delegated authority within a known purpose and risk frame. Without limits, units may act quickly but create harmful effects elsewhere. With excessive limits, they may wait for permission while conditions change.

A useful mission command arrangement separates *what must be preserved* from *how the task may be completed*. The first category can include protected persons, essential capabilities, treaty duties, or critical timing. The second should leave room for local judgment, especially when communications fail or the situation no longer matches the plan.

Decision thresholds make this boundary easier to apply. They can specify when a leader may continue, modify, coordinate, or stop an activity. Thresholds should be based on meaningful conditions rather than arbitrary reporting habits. For example, a change in available support, a new legal restriction, or an unexpected effect on another unit may require coordination even when the main task remains unchanged.

Shared mission command knowledge should also include the consequences of delay. A leader needs to understand not only what requires approval, but what may be lost while waiting. This supports sound judgment when several imperfect options are available.

Delegation becomes credible when higher leaders accept reasonable decisions made within the agreed frame. If every deviation leads to automatic criticism, subordinates learn to avoid initiative. That creates silent delay: people wait, phrase reports cautiously, and protect themselves instead of solving the problem.

After action, the organization should examine whether the decision boundary was clear. Did the leader have enough authority? Were the limits practical? Did a new condition appear that the original frame failed to cover? These questions improve future mission design without turning every decision into a search for blame.

The best knowledge for mission command is not a longer order. It is a precise understanding of purpose, authority, limits, triggers, and responsibility. That knowledge gives subordinate leaders room to act while keeping their choices connected to the mission.

*Source:* [Thoughts about C4I Systems](https://c4isr.blogspot.com/), “Evolution of Military Decision-Making from a Knowledge Management Perspective,” 20 October 2014, CC BY 3.0.

## Collaborative Planning and Shared Courses of Action
**Collaborative planning is most useful when it turns separate courses of action into a shared set of workable options.** The goal is not to make every participant think alike. It is to expose trade-offs early, test feasibility, and show how one choice affects other units and functions.

Each course of action should explain more than a sequence of tasks. It should show the intended effect, required resources, timing, dependencies, likely friction, and conditions that could make the option unsuitable. This gives participants something concrete to examine rather than a vague preference.

- **Purpose:** what the option is meant to achieve.

- **Method:** how the main activities connect.

- **Resources:** which people, capabilities, supplies, and access are required.

- **Dependencies:** which actions must occur first or rely on another unit.

- **Trade-offs:** what the option gains and what it gives up.

- **Decision points:** when leaders must confirm, adjust, or abandon the approach.

Collaboration should include the people who will carry out, support, constrain, or be affected by the plan. A plan that looks elegant to a headquarters may fail because transport, maintenance, medical support, communications, or legal review was treated as an afterthought. Early participation exposes these seams while there is still time to repair them.

Comparing options works better when teams use the same criteria. These may include mission effect, time, resource demand, exposure to risk, reversibility, interoperability, and resilience if communications or support are disrupted. The criteria should be visible, so participants can challenge the weighting rather than argue only about the final ranking.

Red-team review adds further value. A separate group can search for hidden assumptions, weak links, timing conflicts, and second-order effects. It should test the plan seriously, not perform a ritual objection. One sharp challenge may save hours of later correction.

Collaborative planning also creates a common rehearsal of the decision. Participants learn what other units expect, where handoffs occur, and which choices cannot be made independently. This shared mental model reduces surprise during execution without turning the plan into a rigid script.

A concise planning record should retain:

- the options considered;

- the criteria used;

- the main objections and how they were resolved;

- the assumptions that still need testing;

- the conditions for review or change.

This record shows why a course of action was selected and helps later teams distinguish a poor decision from a sound decision made under different conditions. In that sense, collaborative planning does more than support one operation: it creates reusable decision knowledge.

*Source:* [Thoughts about C4I Systems](https://c4isr.blogspot.com/), “Evolution of Military Decision-Making from a Knowledge Management Perspective,” 20 October 2014, CC BY 3.0.

## Lessons Learned and New Knowledge from Operations
**Lessons learned become valuable only when experience is converted into a clear change in future practice.** A report that merely lists events creates an archive. A useful lesson explains what happened, why it mattered, what assumption failed or held, and what should change next time.

Operational learning should examine both success and failure. Successful action may depend on a hidden condition that will not exist in the next mission. Failure may result from poor execution, a weak plan, missing resources, or an unexpected change in the environment. Blame alone cannot distinguish these causes.

- **Event:** what occurred and when.

- **Expectation:** what the unit believed would occur.

- **Difference:** where reality departed from the expectation.

- **Cause:** the factors that produced the gap.

- **Change:** the specific practice, training point, or procedure to revise.

- **Owner:** the person or function responsible for applying the change.

The best lessons are written close to the event, while details remain available, but they should be reviewed later with a wider perspective. Immediate accounts capture decisions and pressures. A later review can identify patterns across units, missions, or time. Both views matter; neither is complete alone.

New knowledge should be tested before it becomes doctrine. One observation may suggest a useful change, but repeated evidence is stronger. Units can trial a revised procedure in training, compare results, and record the conditions under which it works. This prevents a local success from becoming a rigid rule in a different setting.

Learning also needs a clear path into daily work. A lesson has little effect if it remains in a database that nobody consults. It should reach the places where behaviour changes: training objectives, planning checklists, staff routines, equipment choices, and professional education.

Good learning records should distinguish between:

- a confirmed improvement;

- a promising practice that still needs testing;

- a local solution that may not transfer;

- a problem requiring further investigation.

Knowledge can also be lost when personnel rotate or units reorganize. Short handover notes, practical briefings, and updated training material help preserve what individuals learned. The aim is not to capture every personal memory, but to retain the insight that can improve another team’s judgment.

Operational learning completes the knowledge-creation process. Experience becomes shared understanding, then a tested adjustment, and finally a better way to prepare or act. That chain turns collaboration from conversation into institutional improvement.

*Source:* [Thoughts about C4I Systems](https://c4isr.blogspot.com/), “Evolution of Military Decision-Making from a Knowledge Management Perspective,” 20 October 2014, CC BY 3.0.

## Knowledge Systems That Support the OODA Cycle
**Knowledge systems support the OODA cycle when they help people move from raw observations to useful understanding, timely choices, and tested learning.** Their purpose is not to collect every available report, but to preserve the links between an observation, its interpretation, a decision, and the result that followed.

A system should support three distinct knowledge flows:

- **Sense-making:** connect observations with time, source, location, confidence, and context.

- **Decision-making:** show options, assumptions, constraints, dependencies, and approval status.

- **Knowledge creation:** capture results, changes in judgment, and lessons that can improve future action.

The system should also preserve provenance. Users need to know where an item came from, when it was changed, and who added an interpretation. A visible history helps staff distinguish original evidence from later analysis and supports review when a conclusion proves wrong.

Time is another critical factor. Operational knowledge can lose value quickly, so records should show both the event time and the update time. A report entered at 14:00 about an event at 09:00 carries a different meaning from a report entered at 09:00 about the same event. This small distinction prevents many false comparisons.

Good systems make uncertainty easy to record. They should allow users to mark missing information, competing assessments, pending confirmation, and expiry conditions. Forcing every item into a definite category creates a polished picture that may be less truthful than the messy reality.

Search and filtering should follow operational questions, not only organisational structures. A user may need to find all unresolved risks linked to a route, capability, population, or time window. Metadata should therefore describe the subject and decision relevance, not just the office that produced the record.

Access controls must balance protection with usefulness. Role-based access, classification labels, audit logs, and encryption are important safeguards. Yet a system that hides essential context from authorised users can damage decisions just as surely as a system that exposes sensitive data. Access should reflect mission need and legal authority.

Resilience matters when networks are slow, damaged, or unavailable. Users should be able to work with the latest authorised information, record changes locally, and reconcile updates later without silently overwriting another unit’s work. Conflict resolution is part of knowledge integrity.

Useful design measures include:

- time from observation to usable assessment;

- number of unresolved contradictions;

- rate of stale or unowned records;

- time needed to trace a decision back to its evidence;

- lessons that resulted in a tested change.

The strongest knowledge system is not the one with the most screens or records. It is the one that helps a distributed force understand what is known, decide with appropriate speed, and learn from the effects of its choices. That is how technology can reinforce the OODA cycle rather than merely display information.

*Source:* [Thoughts about C4I Systems](https://c4isr.blogspot.com/), “Evolution of Military Decision-Making from a Knowledge Management Perspective,” 20 October 2014, CC BY 3.0.

## Fazit: Share Knowledge That Enables Mission Command and Faster Decisions
**The best knowledge to share is knowledge that helps people act correctly when the plan meets reality.** It should clarify purpose, expose uncertainty, connect decisions to consequences, and preserve lessons that improve future performance. More information is not automatically better. Relevant, trusted, and usable knowledge is.

A practical test is to ask whether shared knowledge enables a person or unit to:

- understand the mission’s purpose;

- recognize what has changed;

- judge the limits of current knowledge;

- choose a lawful and workable response;

- explain the reason for that choice;

- improve the next decision from the result.

Collaboration should therefore be judged by decision quality, not by the volume of messages exchanged. A crowded information space can slow action just as surely as a missing report. The real measure is whether knowledge reaches the people who need it, in a form they can use, while its meaning and limitations remain clear.

Mission command depends on this discipline. Senior leaders provide purpose and a workable frame. Subordinate leaders add judgment shaped by direct experience. Staffs connect different functions and identify effects that one unit cannot see alone. Learning teams then turn experience into better preparation. Each role contributes a different kind of knowledge, and the force becomes stronger when those contributions fit together.

The final standard should be demanding but simple: **share what improves understanding, expands sound choice, or prevents a repeated mistake.** Protect what must be protected, remove what adds noise, and keep uncertainty visible. That balance supports faster decisions without pretending that complex situations are simple.

Collaboration is therefore not merely a communication method. It is a way to distribute judgment while preserving a shared purpose. Armies that manage knowledge in this way can adapt without losing cohesion, act without waiting for every detail, and learn faster than the situation changes.

*Source:* [Thoughts about C4I Systems](https://c4isr.blogspot.com/), “Evolution of Military Decision-Making from a Knowledge Management Perspective,” published 20 October 2014 under CC BY 3.0.

## Useful links on the topic

- [Tacit Knowledge Cultivation as an Essential Component of ...](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Journal-of-Military-Learning/Journal-of-Military-Learning-Archives/JML-Apr-2019/Babin-Garvin-Tacit-Knowledge/)
- [Harnessing the Power of Knowledge Management](https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2024/04/12/harnessing-the-power-of-knowledge-management/)
- [Army University](https://www.army.edu/)

---

*Dieser Artikel wurde ursprünglich veröffentlicht auf [corporate-knowhow.com](https://corporate-knowhow.com/what-kind-of-knowledge-is-best-shared-through-collaboration-in-the-army/)*
*© 2026 Provimedia GmbH*